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Using a sample of 231 entrepreneurial firm successions in Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Taiwan, we find that firms’ unsigned discretionary accruals decrease while timely 
loss recognition increases subsequent to successions, suggesting a shift in accounting 
toward a less insider-based system. We argue that the change in accounting properties 
is due to the loss of specialized assets in the succession process, such as the 
entrepreneur’s reputation and political/social networks, inducing the firm to adapt to 
market-based rather than relationship-based contracting. Moreover, we find that the 
extent of the shift in accounting is larger in founder successions than in subsequent 
(non-founder) successions, as the dissipation of specialized assets is greatest in 
founder successions. 
 
Keywords: Succession, founder, corporate governance, accounting properties. 
 
JEL classification: G32; L14; M41   3 
1. Introduction 
 
  Entrepreneurial firms, especially those in emerging markets, are typically 
tightly controlled by a family -- often in the hands of one person, the founder. Past 
research finds that the accounting transparency of these firms is low.
1
  Existing studies have attributed the low transparency of insider-based 
accounting systems primarily to entrepreneurs basing contracts on personal networks 
and inside communications. Such contracting practices can change significantly, 
however, when the entrepreneur passes control to his heir or a professional manager. 
This paper attempts to examine whether contractual arguments can explain changes in 
firms’ accounting practices around leadership successions.  
 In particular, 
these firms tend to practice insider-based accounting that is characterized by less 
timely loss recognition (Ball et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2000) and low earnings 
informativeness (Fan and Wong, 2002).  
Entrepreneurial firms typically possess assets that are specialized in that they 
are not easily partitioned, evaluated, or transferred across individuals or 
organizational boundaries (Alchian, 1965). For example, entrepreneurial activities 
often involve teamwork where family members contribute their labor and financial 
resources short of formal contracts. Enforced by family ties, these implicit contracts 
provide high-power incentives (Williamson, 1985) that are valuable to the firm, but 
they are specialized to the family as they cannot be replicated by or transferred to 
another management team. Similarly, while the entrepreneur can easily sell his 
factory, he would have difficulty selling specialized assets such as his reputation or 
political connections that are critical to the profitability of the factory. Because 
specialized assets cannot be capitalized easily in the markets, the value of the assets to 
the firm can deviate from their market value substantially (Fan et al., 2008). Not 
surprisingly, specialized assets based on implicit contracts and personal networks lead   4 
to an insider-based accounting system that relies on private communications rather 
than costly public disclosures (Ball et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005). Entrepreneurial firms are therefore associated with low 
accounting transparency. 
While successful entrepreneurs often have certain specific assets that give 
them a competitive edge, these assets are subject to high transfer costs in succession. 
Even sons and daughters can only partially inherit specialized assets such as the 
founder’s reputation and networks. Short of the assets necessary to enforce 
relationship-based contracts, the firm under the control of the heir is likely to shift 
more to arms-length contracts that rely less on personal networks. We therefore 
expect that the firm will change from an insider-based accounting system to a more 
outsider-based system upon a succession. Moreover, because the dissipation of 
specialized assets is more pronounced when the founder, who built the specialized 
assets, transfers control to his successor than in subsequent successions, we expect the 
change in accounting system to be more pronounced in the initial succession where 
the founder is predecessor than in subsequent successions where non-founders are 
predecessors.         
Our empirical tests are based on a sample of 231 successions in three 
economies, namely, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, during the 1987 through 
2005 period. We find that after the succession events, the firms’ unsigned 
discretionary accruals are lower while their timely loss recognition is greater than 
their pre-succession levels. This suggests that entrepreneurial firms shift to a less 
insider-based accounting system upon succession.  
Further evidence shows that the changes in unsigned discretionary accruals 
and timely loss recognition are larger for an initial succession than for subsequent 
successions. This evidence suggests a larger shift towards a less insider-based   5 
accounting system as the founder transfers control to his successor than in subsequent 
successions. Moreover, among the initial successions, we document that firms with 
older or less educated founders are associated with a more insider-based accounting 
system in the years prior to their successions, possibly because these firms depend 
more on specialized assets or relationship-based contracting than do otherwise similar 
firms.   
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides an 
explanation for why founder control, and more generally the life cycle of a firm, 
affects accounting properties. Second, in addition to the insiders’ private benefit 
consumption argument, this paper offers another explanation for insider-based 
accounting systems prevalent in emerging markets that transact primarily through 
relationship-based contracts. Third, the succession events of interest in this paper, and 
in particular those that involve founders, provide a unique setting to test the roles of 
specialized, non-transferable assets in an insider-based accounting model. The time-
serial comparison also offers more robust results than cross-sectional tests. Finally, 
our findings echo those in Ball et al. (2003) that firms’ incentives rather than 
accounting standards play a more significant role in determining firms’ accounting 
properties.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 presents empirical results and 
Section 5 concludes the paper.    
 
2. Hypotheses 
Relationship-based contracting and accounting properties 
  Recent accounting literature examines how the contracting and the 
organizational form of family firms affect accounting properties. Using a sample of   6 
US S&P 500 firms, Wang (2006) finds that founding family firms have higher quality 
financial reporting. More specifically, they are associated with lower abnormal 
accruals, higher earnings informativeness, and less persistence of transitory 
components in earnings. Wang argues that through stronger incentive alignment from 
more concentrated ownership, US family firms suffer less from agency conflicts and 
thus are less opportunistic in financial reporting than firms with diffuse ownership. 
Using the same dataset and similar agency arguments, Ali et al. (2007) confirm 
Wang’s results.  
  In contrast to these US studies, Fan and Wong (2002) find that the 
concentrated family ownership of East Asian firms is associated with lower earnings 
informativeness. They argue that concentrated control and accounting opacity protect 
these firms’ economic and political rents from competition and political/social 
sanction. Also, concentration of control may lead to entrenchment and controlling 
families may use accounting to cover up their opportunistic activities.  
Several other studies have added to our understanding of the role of politics 
and networks in family firms. Morck (1996) argues that a family’s reputation and 
tight control over the company increase the ability of the company to trade favors 
with politicians, and thus family firms are more likely to reduce accounting 
transparency in order to pursue political rent-seeking. Using a sample of Indonesian 
firms that are politically connected to the Suharto regime, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 
(2006) find that these firms are less willing to cross-list in the US because the increase 
in transparency would jeopardize their political connections with the Suharto 
government. Ball et al. (2003) argue that ethnic Chinese family firms in East Asia 
often increase accounting opacity to avoid government predation, a form of political 
cost resulting from the government seeking rents from the firms. These studies   7 
demonstrate that a firm’s relationships with important stakeholders, especially the 
government, play a significant role in shaping the firm’s accounting system.  
In this paper, we present a more general contracting argument for the relation 
between family ownership and accounting properties of emerging market firms. We 
argue that entrepreneurial activities are associated with specialized assets such as 
reputation and social/political networks that facilitate relationship-based contracting 
in place of arms-length contracting. Enforced by family, social, or political sanctions, 
the relationship-based contracts dominate market-based transactions in markets with 
weak legal institutions (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003). As prior research 
shows, an example of a specialized asset that facilitates relationship contracting is 
family firms’ ability to trade favors with governments (Morck, 1996; Fan and Wong, 
2002; Ball et al., 2003; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). 
These specialized assets are often highly personalized (valuable only to an 
individual) and non-transferrable. The concentrated control of the firm is important 
because it preserves the value of these assets. High ownership concentration suggests 
that the information asymmetry between owners and managers can be resolved 
through “insider access” communication (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). More 
importantly, the presence of specialized assets and relationship-based contracts create 
measurement difficulties using standardized accounting procedures (Demsetz, 1964; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Cheung, 1983), inducing firms to rely more on private 
communications than public disclosures.  
As argued in Fan and Wong (2002), the concentrated control of these Asian 
family firms can lead to entrenchment and accounting opacity. This perhaps is an 
undesirable side effect of family firms having specialized assets, concentrated control, 
and an insider-access accounting system. On the one hand, the specialized assets 
facilitate relationship contracting that is associated with concentrated ownership and   8 
opaque accounting. On the other hand, these assets may create opportunities for 
controlling owners to expropriate outside shareholders and use accounting to cover up 
their entrenchment. In Section 4 we will explore whether this entrenchment argument 
is an alternative explanation for our results.  
Family succession and accounting properties 
  Specialized assets can explain not only ownership concentration (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985) but also observed patterns in firm successions, namely, family 
successions where ownership is passed down to an heir.  Even if the heir is not as 
capable as outside professionals (Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999; Perez-Gonzalez, 
2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007), he can at least partially 
inherit and capitalize on the specialized assets (Fan et al., 2008).  
As the family firm passes control from one generation to the next, the loss in 
specialized assets will change the way the firm conducts its operations, contracts with 
its stakeholders, governs itself, and designs its accounting system. Internally, the 
successor will adopt more outsider-based accounting to facilitate increasingly 
standardized operating procedures and mitigate possible agency conflicts with 
managers hired from outside the family. Externally, stakeholders such as shareholders, 
suppliers, and customers will demand more outsider-based communication when the 
successor is only able to inherit part of the founder’s reputation to enforce contracts.  
Based upon the above discussion, we predict that in an entrepreneurial firm 
succession, the firm is likely to shift to a less insider-based system. In addition, the 
extent of the dissipation in specialized assets and the shift toward market-based 
contracting is likely to be larger for founder successions than non-founder successions 
(see the Appendix for a founder succession example and a non-founder succession 
example).
2 The reason is that the extent of asset specificity is greater in founder-
controlled firms than in firms controlled by second- or later-generation descendants.   9 
 
3. Data and Sample 
We employ a sample of successions in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan 
assembled by Fan et al. (2008). Below we describe the sampling procedure. 
Identifying successions 
The key task is to identify successions by tracking turnovers of chairmen over 
time.
3
In principal, a succession takes place in the year in which one chairman steps 
down and is replaced by a new chairman. However, several additional criteria are 
needed. First, firms controlled by foreign entities are excluded. Second, we require 
that a founder not only relinquish his chairmanship but also his directorship for a 
succession to be confirmed. This is because successions, especially those that involve 
the founder, typically start early on when the founder starts getting old but are not 
fully completed until he exits from the management team. Finally, different from 
leadership turnovers in diffusely held firms, sample successions must be associated 
with transfers of controlling ownership from the predecessor to the successor. 
 A succession takes place when a family member or an unrelated professional is 
appointed to the position of chairman. Annual reports of all publicly traded companies 
since their initial public offerings in the three economies are used to track chairman 
turnovers. 
Data sources 
Public disclosures are used to identify succession and ultimate shareholdings 
of founding families. These information sources include company prospectuses, 
annual reports, and other sources such as local newspapers and magazines in each of 
the economies under study. Company prospectuses and annual reports typically 
disclose information on director profiles, shareholdings of large shareholders, and   10 
related party transactions that are useful for identifying business group affiliations and 
relationships among board members. Stories covered by various newspapers, 
magazines, and periodicals are referenced when they provide supplementary 
information. For key information that is ambiguous or unavailable in the public 
domain, expert opinions or the families in question are consulted.  All financial data 
come from hard copies of annual reports and from electronic databases such as 
Worldscope, PACAP, and TEJ (Taiwan).  
[Table 1 inserted here] 
  The final sample consists of 231 successions spanning the 1987 to 2005 period. 
In particular, the sample covers all successions of publicly traded companies from 
1996 to 2005 for Hong Kong, 1991 to 2005 for Singapore, and 1987 to 2001 for 
Taiwan. Panel A of Table 1 presents sample summary statistics by year, economy, 
and succession type (founder vs. non-founder). There is no strong clustering of 
successions in a particular calendar year in any of the three economies. However, 
Taiwanese firms have a much higher proportion of founder successions at 76%, 
followed by Hong Kong at 52%, and Singapore at only 9%. There is no trend of an 
increase or decrease in the proportion of founder successions in any of the three 
economies. Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the sample by industry sector, economy, 
and succession type. Most (76) successions in Taiwan correspond to the 
manufacturing sector, while Hong Kong and Singapore have more successions in 
finance, insurance, and real estate in addition to manufacturing. The industry 
distribution of the sample is quite representative of the general industry distribution of 
firms in each of these economies. 
 
4. Empirical Results   11 
  This section presents the empirical results on the patterns of accounting 
properties before and after succession. We examine changes in the accounting 
properties of the succession firms by comparing the accounting properties in the five 
years prior to succession (pre-succession period) with the same set of firms in the year 
of succession or the five years after succession (post-succession period).   
Earnings properties before and after succession 
Discretionary Accruals 
  We first present the results on unsigned discretionary accruals. Instead of 
using signed discretionary accruals to investigate whether firms manage earnings in 
an expected direction, we use unsigned accruals because we conjecture that firms 
using an insider-based accounting system rely less on earnings for communication 
with outside investors. Instead, they are likely to use discretionary accruals to increase 
opacity in order to protect proprietary information such as their business strategies, 
special contracts, business networks, or favors received from the government (Fan 
and Wong, 2002; Haw et al., 2004).   
  Discretionary accruals are estimated as follows. First, total accruals of firm i 
in year t (TAit) are measured according to:  
TAit = (∆CAit - ∆CASHit ) - (∆CLit - ∆STDit - ∆TPit) - DEPit,  
where  
∆CAit  is change in current assets,  
∆CASHit  is change in cash,  
∆CLit is change in current liabilities,  
∆STDit is change in short-term debt,  
∆TPit is change in taxes payable, and  
DEPit is depreciation expenses.  
 
  Next, normal accruals are predicted by the following version of the Jones 
(1993) model, which is estimated using all firms without any succession event in each 
one-digit SIC industry for each fiscal year:   12 
TAit/ASSETit-1    = β1*1/ ASSETit-1 +β2*(∆SALESit-∆ARit)/ ASSETit-1  
+β3*PPEit/ ASSETit-1 +β4*ROAit+εit,        (1) 
where  
 
ASSETSit-1 is total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1,  
∆SALESit  is change in sales of firm i in year t,  
∆ARit is change in accounts receivable of firm i in year t,  
PPEit is net property, plant, and equipment of firm i in year t, and 
ROAit is return on assets of firm i in year t.  
  Finally, discretionary accruals of the succession samples are calculated using 
the normal accruals prediction model above.
4
Summary statistics of both the unsigned accruals and the control variables 
used in multivariate regressions below are presented in Panel A of Table 2. The 
univariate analysis shows that the level of unsigned discretionary accruals is 
significantly higher in the pre-succession period than in the post-succession period. 
Our robustness check indicates that the signed accruals are not statistically larger in 
the pre-succession period than in the post-succession period. This suggests that the 
succession firms do not use discretionary accruals to inflate earnings prior to 
succession.   
 
Next, we examine the general firm characteristics of the sample before and 
after succession. Using sales to proxy for size, Panel A shows that the firms’ average 
total sales in the post-succession period is larger than that in the pre-succession period, 
indicating that the succession firms are not necessarily shrinking in terms of sales. 
Further, firms have significantly higher financial leverage in the pre-succession period 
than in the post-succession period. Finally, comparison of firms’ market-to-book 
equity across the pre- and post-succession periods shows that succession firms 
observe a significant decline in market-to-book equity after the succession, consistent 
with prior evidence that the substantial value of specialized assets is dissipated in the   13 
succession process (Fan et al., 2008). However, we do not find a significant change in 
ownership concentration across the pre- and post-succession periods. The correlation 
matrix reported in Table 2 Panel B does not identify a high correlation between any 
two variables.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
  The test of unsigned discretionary accruals around a succession is performed 
using the following OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country and 
firm: 
DTAit = β0 + β1 SUCCESSIONit + β2 SIZEit + β3 LEVERAGEit + β4 MBit + εit,  (2) 
where 
DTAit is the unsigned discretionary accruals for firm i at time t estimated using the 
accruals model in equation (1), 
SUCCESSIONit is one for the post-succession period and zero for the pre-succession 
period,  
SIZEit is the logarithm of sales for firm i at time t, 
LEVERAGEit is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets for firm i at time t, and 
MBit is the market-to-book equity ratio for firm i at time t; 
Year, industry, and country fixed effects are also controlled for in the model.  
 
Panel C of Table 2 reports the results of the multivariate regressions.
5 Without 
controlling for any other variables except year, country, and industry fixed effects, 
model (1) shows that the coefficient on SUCCESSION is negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that the unsigned discretionary accruals 
decrease after succession.
6 The significance of the coefficient on SUCCESSION 
increases to the 5% level after including the control variables SIZE, LEVERAGE, and 
MB in model (2).  Overall, these results are consistent with our conjecture that 
entrepreneurial firms operate under a more insider-based accounting system prior to 
succession, but less so after succession. The results in all the models also suggest that 
smaller firms, firms with higher leverage, and firms with higher market-to-book 
equity have consistently higher unsigned discretionary accruals.    14 
An alternative explanation for the results in models (1) and (2) is that 
entrenched predecessors use unsigned discretionary accruals to cover up private 
benefit consumption (Fan and Wong, 2002; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Leuz 
and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). In this case, the change in accounting properties around 
succession is due to the change in the level of private benefit consumption.  To test 
this story, we conjecture that the level of entrenchment and private benefit 
consumption are likely to be positively associated with family ownership 
concentration and negatively associated with the firm’s profitability prior to 
succession. We conjecture that ownership concentration increases controlling 
families’ ability to expropriate minority shareholders and that the resulting 
entrenchment will lead to low firm profitability. Thus, we add average performance 
(ROA) in the pre-succession period, denoted as PRE-ROA, and the family’s share 
ownership percentage in model (3). Although ownership concentration is found to be 
positively associated with the level of unsigned discretionary accruals, the 
significantly positive coefficient on PRE-ROA does not support the entrenchment 
interpretation. This result is corroborated by the finding in Fan et al. (2008) that there 
is no surge in share value for these firms at or after the succession. If there were 
heavy expropriation and earnings management prior to succession, we would expect 
to see a positive change in firm value when the problems associated with 
entrenchment and earnings management become less severe after the succession. 
Finally, the coefficient on SUCCESSION remains significantly negative after 
controlling for these two additional variables, providing further support to our 
contracting hypothesis.   
Timely Loss Recognition 
  Next, we use timely loss recognition to measure changes in accounting system 
around successions. Prior research such as Ball et al. (2000, 2003) and Ball and   15 
Shivakumar (2005) finds that insider-based accounting systems are associated with 
less timely loss recognition. Thus, we investigate whether succession firms shift to a 
more outsider-based system that practices more timely loss recognition.  
We use two regression models in the literature to test the degree of timely loss 
recognition before and after the succession, namely, the earnings-returns analysis in 
Basu (1997) and the income persistence analysis in Basu (1997) and Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005). The earnings-returns analysis makes use of firms’ annual stock 
returns to estimate their total news content during a year. Since succession firms’ 
stock returns may measure news content with much greater error because they 
experience a significant change in share value prior to succession (Fan et al., 2008), 
the income persistence analysis serves as an alternative approach that allows us to test 
timely loss recognition without relying on stock returns to capture economic news 
associated with the firms.  
  For the earnings-returns analysis, we use the following model: 
EARNINGSit = β0 + β1 RETURNit +  β2 RDit + β3 RETURNit × RDit + β4 
SUCCESSIONit + β5 RETURNit  × SUCCESSIONit +  β6 RDit × SUCCESSIONit 
+ β7 RETURNit × RDit × SUCCESSIONit + εit,       
      (3) 
where 
EARNINGSit is net income scaled by beginning-of-year market value of equity for 
firm i in year t, 
RETURNit is the annual net-of-market return within the fiscal year for firm i in year t,  
RDit  is one for bad news when RETURN is negative and zero otherwise for firm i in 
year t, and 
SUCCESSIONit is one for the post-succession period and zero for the pre-succession 
period.  
  Our alternative method, the income persistence analysis, uses the following 
model:   16 
ΔINCit = β0 + β1 ΔINCit-1 + β2 DΔINCit-1 + β3 ΔINCit-1 × DΔINCit-1 + β4 
SUCCESSIONit + β5 ΔINCit-1 × SUCCESSIONit + β6 DΔINCit-1 × 
SUCCESSIONit + β7 ΔINCit-1 × DΔINCit-1 × SUCCESSIONit + εit,  (4) 
where 
ΔINCt is change in net income scaled by year-end total assets for firm i in year t,  
ΔINCt-1 is change in net income scaled by year-end total assets for firm i in year t-1,  
DΔINCt-1 is one if ΔINCt-1 is negative and zero otherwise, and 
SUCCESSIONit is one for the post-succession period and zero for the pre-succession 
period. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables in 
regression models (3) and (4). In the earnings-returns analysis, both mean and median 
annual net-of-market returns, RETURN, in the post-succession period are higher than 
those in the pre-succession period. This indicates that the decline in firm value finally 
stops as the firm completes the succession process. These stock price patterns are 
consistent with those reported in Fan et al. (2008). 
There is no significant decline in mean EARNINGS, measured as net income 
over market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year prior to the succession.
7 
The earnings pattern is not in line with the pattern of annual stock returns for firms in 
the pre-succession period for two possible reasons. First, the decrease in returns 
reflects the dissipation of specialized assets that are intangible and unrecognized, but 
that have no immediate impact on earnings. However, the decline in specialized assets 
and share values will have a longer-term effect on firm earnings. This may explain 
why earnings of post-succession firms are significantly lower than those of pre-
succession firms.
8 Second, the decline in earnings after the succession is consistent 
with succession firms adopting a more conservative accounting system, which is in 
line with a less insider-based approach in contracting and accounting.    17 
Finally, there is a lower median ∆INCt-1 for firms in the post-succession 
period than for firms in the pre-succession period. These patterns are similar to the 
pattern for the level of earnings captured in EARNINGS.   
Earnings-returns Association 
We first use the earnings-returns (Basu) model to test succession firms’ degree 
of timely loss recognition. A positive coefficient on RETURN × RD suggests that 
earnings have a more timely response to bad news than good news. The comparison 
of timely loss recognition across pre- and post-succession periods is captured by the 
coefficient on RETURN × RD × SUCESSION, with a positive coefficient signaling a 
more timely response to bad news in the post-succession period. The coefficient on 
RETURN × RD × SUCESSION is significantly positive in model (1), which is 
consistent with our conjecture that prior to succession, entrepreneurial firms operate 
under a more insider-based accounting system, but following succession the practice 
becomes less insider-based.
9
Income Persistence  
  
In our second set of regressions we conduct income persistence analysis. A 
negative coefficient on ∆INC × D∆INC indicates that negative earnings are less 
persistent. If firms have significantly more transitory (less persistent) components in 
negative earnings in the post-succession period than the pre-succession period, the 
coefficient on ∆INC × D∆INC × SUCCESSION will be negative. However, the 
coefficient on ∆INC × D∆INC × SUCCESSION in model (2) is negative but not 
statistically significant.  
Effect of founder vs. non-founder succession on accounting earnings properties 
We next present the results on how a founder vs. non-founder chairman 
succession affects the accounting earnings properties of succession firms before and   18 
after the succession. Table 4 presents the discretionary accruals results, and Table 5 
presents the timely loss recognition results of the earnings-returns as well as the 
income persistence models. 
Accruals 
Based on regression models in Table 2, we add the independent variables 
FOUNDER and FOUNDER × SUCCESSION, where FOUNDER equals one if the 
predecessor is a founder and zero otherwise. FOUNDER helps capture the effect of 
the predecessor chairman being a founder on the succession firms’ unsigned 
discretionary accruals before and after the succession. In addition, FOUNDER × 
SUCCESSION tests whether a founder predecessor is significantly associated with an 
incrementally sharper decline in unsigned accruals after the succession, as indicated 
by a significantly negative coefficient. An incremental drop in unsigned accruals 
would be consistent with our conjecture that the founder possesses specialized assets 
that facilitate relationship-based contracting and hence are more compatible with an 
insider-based accounting system, but that are highly personalized and non-
transferrable, increasing the firm’s need to engage in arms-length contracts and adopt 
a less insider-based accounting system after the succession. Thus, compared with a 
firm with a non-founder predecessor, a firm with a founder predecessor will 
experience a greater decline in unsigned accruals as it switches more sharply to a 
much less insider-based accounting system. The results in model (1) through model 
(3) show that the coefficient on FOUNDER × SUCCESSION is significantly negative, 
supporting our conjecture.
10
[Insert Table 4 here] 
  
We next consider whether founder-controlled firms are associated with higher 
levels of unsigned discretionary accruals prior to the succession. The results are   19 
reported in models (4) and (5) in Table 4. The coefficient on FOUNDER is positive 
but not statistically significant, suggesting that the larger unsigned accruals prior to 
succession are not concentrated only among founder predecessor firms.  
Change in Timely Loss Recognition before and after Succession 
Next, we investigate how founder vs. non-founder succession affects timely 
loss recognition (earnings’ responsiveness to bad news) after the succession. Our 
conjecture suggests that compared with non-founder succession firms, firms with a 
founder predecessor will experience a larger increase in timely loss recognition after 
the succession. Using models (1) and (2) of Table 3 Panel B as baseline models for 
the earnings-returns and income persistence analyses, respectively, we rerun each of 
the two regressions with the pre- and post-succession firm samples partitioned into 
founder predecessor firms and non-founder predecessor firms.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
If there is significant improvement in timely loss recognition after the 
succession, the coefficient on RETURN × RD × SUCESSION will be significantly 
positive in the earnings-return analysis and the coefficient on ∆INC × D∆INC × 
SUCCESSION will be negative in the income persistence analysis. The results in 
Table 5 Panel A support our hypothesis. Specifically, in the earnings-returns analysis, 
we find that the coefficient on RETURN × RD × SUCESSION is significantly 
positive in the founder succession subsample but not in the non-founder succession 
subsample. Similarly, in the income persistence analysis, we find that the coefficient 
on ∆INC × D∆INC × SUCCESSION is significantly negative in the founder 
succession subsample but not in the non-founder succession subsample.
11 In an 
alternative test, we use the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model by regressing total 
accruals on cash flows. Similar to the income persistence results, we find among   20 
founder succession firms that the association between total accruals and cash flows 
upon bad news (negative cash flows) is significantly less negative in the pre-
succession period than the post-succession period.  We do not document such a result 
among non-founder succession firms.    
It is important to note that to formally test our conjecture, we need to perform 
a formal test of the difference in coefficients on RETURN × RD × SUCESSION and 
∆INC × D∆INC × SUCCESSION between the founder and non-founder succession 
subsamples. However, this would involve a four-way interaction in the regression and 
would make the results unstable. We therefore highlight the caveat that our results in 
Table 5 Panel A are suggestive and not a formal test of our conjecture.  
Timely Loss Recognition in the Pre-succession Period 
In this subsection, we examine whether founder vs. non-founder predecessor 
status affects timely loss recognition in the pre-succession period. More specifically, 
using only the pre-succession observations we run the Basu model (earnings-returns 
analysis) and Ball and Shivakumar model (income persistence analysis) with 
FOUNDER and its interaction terms. We expect the coefficient on RETURN × RD × 
FOUNDER in the earnings-returns analysis to be significantly negative, while we 
expect the coefficient on ∆INC × D∆INC × FOUNDER to be significantly positive. 
Our results reported in Table 5 Panel B support this conjecture. This subsection 
therefore provides a formal test showing that predecessor type (founder vs. non-
founder) does have a significant impact on firms’ level of timely loss recognition in 




In this section, we further explore how, compared with non-founder-controlled 
firms, founder-controlled firms are likely to possess a higher level of asset or skill   21 
specificity and thus a more insider-based accounting system. First, we explore 
whether the founder’s age at the time of succession is associated with the firm’s 
accounting properties.  A founder’s advancement in age at the time of succession may 
indicate that he possesses a high level of specialized assets that are difficult to pass on 
to the next generation, in which case a founder’s age may be positively associated 
with the level of asset specificity or with an insider-based contracting and accounting 
system prior to succession. Our argument is along the same line as Smith and 
Amoako-Adu (1998), who use the successor’s younger age as a proxy for lack of 
expertise and less established reputation.  Second, we analyze whether the founder’s 
education level proxies for his level of specialized assets. To be a founder of one of 
the listed firms in our sample, he should possess special abilities in growing his 
business. Thus, a founder with a low level of education indicates that he is likely to be 
endowed with skills or knowledge that are not acquired through standard educational 
channels. With such skills or knowledge that are highly individual-specific in nature, 
the firm is likely to adopt an insider-based contracting and accounting system. 
To formally test these hypotheses on how a founder’s age and education affect 
firms’ accounting properties in the pre-succession period, we again use unsigned 
discretionary accruals and timely loss recognition. We use both continuous and binary 
variables for age and education. The binary variable for age is set equal to one when 
the founder’s age is 80 or above (30% of the founders and 10% of non-founders are in 
this age group), while education is set equal to one when the founder’s education level 
is at the bachelor degree level or above. To increase the power of the test, we use only 
the founder succession firms and replicate the models of Table 4 model (2) for 
unsigned discretionary accruals and Table 5 Panel B models (1) and (2) for the timely 
loss recognition regressions. In addition, we replace FOUNDER with FOUNDER’S 
BACKGROUND for the founder’s age (Table 6 Panel B models (1) and (2), and   22 
Table 6 Panel C models (1) and (3)) and education level (Table 6 Panel B models (3) 
and (4), and Table 6 Panel C models (2) and (4)).  
The summary statistics on predecessor age and education are presented in 
Table 6 Panel A. Due to the poor disclosure practices of the three sample economies, 
especially in the 1980s and early 1990s, 63 succession firms do not have information 
on the age of predecessors and 104 firms have missing information on predecessors’ 
education level. Even more information on predecessor age and education is missing 
for non-founder firms, suggesting that it is probably more important to disclose such 
information for founders than non-founders. Consistent with our expectations, the 
mean (median) age of founder predecessors is 70.57 (72), which is significantly 
higher than the mean (median) age of non-founder predecessors at 61.5 (60). 
Similarly, the average education level of founder predecessors is below the bachelor 
level, which is significantly lower than the bachelor level of non-founder predecessors.        
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
Effect of the Founder’s Age and Education on Discretionary Accruals 
The regression results in Panel B of Table 6 show that the coefficient on 
FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND for education in models (3) and (4) is negative and 
statistically significant, which supports our conjecture that a lower level of education 
for the founder is associated with higher unsigned discretionary accruals. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that the lower the founder’s education, the higher the 
succession firm’s asset specificity level and the more insider-based the firm’s 
accounting. The coefficient on FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND for age in models (1) 
and (2) is negative but not statistically significant.  
Effect of the Founder’s Age and Education on Timely Loss Recognition 
The timely loss recognition results for the founder’s age and education are 
reported in Panel C of Table 6. We conjecture that earnings have a more timely   23 
response to bad news when the founder’s age is low and education level is high. That 
is, we expect that the coefficient on RETURN × RD × FOUNDER’S 
BACKGROUND is negative for founder’s age and positive for founder’s education. 
Consistent with this conjecture, the earnings-returns results show that the coefficient 
on RETURN × RD × FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND is negative and statistically 
significant for age in models (1) and (2), and is positive for education with t-statistics 
of 2.30 in model (3) and 1.51 in model (4).  
For the income persistence regressions, we expect the coefficient on ΔINC × 
DΔINC × FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND to be positive for founder’s age and 
negative for founder’s education. The income persistence results show that the 
coefficient on ΔINC × DΔINC × FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND is positive for age 
with t-statistics of 1.59 in model (5) and 2.12 in model (6). This evidence supports our 
earlier conjecture. However, the sign of the coefficient on ΔINC × DΔINC × 
FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND is statistically insignificantly different from zero for 
education.  
In summary, we find that the founder’s education level has a significant 
impact on firms’ unsigned discretionary accruals in the pre-succession period, while 
the founder’s age influences a firm’s timely loss recognition in the pre-succession 
period when using the earnings-returns and income persistence models and the 
founder’s education influences a firm’s timely loss recognition in pre-succession 
period using the earnings-return association model.  
Note that there is a potential alternative explanation for the decrease in 
unsigned discretionary accruals and increase in earnings responsiveness to bad news 
after the succession. Rather than a change in contracting and accounting system being 
a result of a decrease in asset specificity surrounding a succession, it may be the case   24 
that entrenched predecessors induce accounting opacity to cover up poor performance 
prior to the succession. In this case, high unsigned accruals and low earnings 
responsiveness to bad news would be a result of predecessors’ entrenchment, not 
necessarily their possession of specialized assets and skills, leading to the use of 
insider-based accounting systems. However, our additional tests relating a founder’s 
education to the firm’s accounting properties prior to succession may lend credence to 
the contracting hypothesis. To the extent that a low level of education captures a 
founder’s possession of specialized assets but does not proxy for entrenchment, our 
results support the view that the changes in accounting properties around a succession 
are associated with succession firms’ changes in contracting and accounting system.  
 
5. Conclusion 
  This paper examines whether emerging market entrepreneurial firms shift 
from an insider-based accounting system to a more outsider-based system around a 
leadership/ownership succession. Using a sample of 231 chairman successions in 
three East Asian Economies (Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan), we find that 
compared with the five years prior to succession, succession firms report lower 
unsigned discretionary accruals and more timely loss recognition in the year of and 
the five years after the succession.  
This result is consistent with our conjecture that family firms possess 
specialized assets such as reputation and social/political networks that facilitate 
relationship contracting but are highly personalized (belonging to the predecessor) 
and non-transferrable, losing value when the firms are transferred from the 
predecessors to their successors. This implies that the extent to which the specialized 
assets can facilitate relationship-based contracts decreases around a succession, with 
the succession firm adopting more arms-length contracts. As a consequence of this   25 
change in contracting mechanism, the entrepreneurial firm’s accounting system will 
also shift from an insider-based system to a more outsider-based system.  
  Further supporting this argument, we find that the change in accounting 
properties is significantly greater for successions that involve founder predecessors 
than for those with non-founder predecessors. Founder predecessors, who personally 
developed the specialized assets in the firms, will see a larger drop in these assets’ 
amount and value at the initial succession than will their successors when they pass 
down the inherited assets to their heirs in subsequent successions. This larger decline 
in the specialized assets’ amount and value is likely to induce firms to make a more 
significant shift to an outsider-based accounting system in the initial succession than 
in subsequent successions. 
  Future research should focus on collecting data for identification and 
measurement of entrepreneurial firms’ key specialized assets. This would shed light 
on whether and how these specialized assets shape the ways in which firms organize 
their ownership and governance structures, and the way in which they pass control on 
to the next generation. Such data would also allow for more understanding of how 
specialized assets serve as a fundamental factor in determining a firm’s accounting 
system and properties.        26 
Appendix: Succession Examples 
Case 1: Founder Succession 
 
China Motor Bus Ltd. (hereafter as CMB) was founded by Ngan Shing-kwan 
and his father-in-law, Wong Wang-cai, in 1924. The first milestone of the company 
was to obtain the public bus service franchise in Hong Kong Island in 1933. The 
company’s operations were terminated during World War II. They resumed full 
operation in 1948 and continued to boom until the 1980s.  In 1962, the company went 
public through a listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. At its peak, the company 
owned more than one thousand buses, operated more than one hundred bus lines, and 
served 300 million passengers annually. 
 
 Ngan Shing-kwan managed the company for 77 years until he died in 2001, 
while still serving as chairman of the company. His daughter Ngan Kit-ling succeeded 
as chairman of the company; she had been managing the company since the mid-
1990s when her father was in his 90s.  
 
A comparison of the father (founder) and daughter (heir) will enhance our 
understanding of the fundamental changes in the firm around succession.  The father 
received wide recognition in the business as well as political arenas. Due to his 
success in the bus service business, he was named “the Father of Hong Kong Bus 
Service”.  He was the first Chinese appointed to the Executive Council of the Hong 
Kong government and the first Chinese sitting on both Executive and Legislative 
Councils. With his high social and political status in the city, he was regarded “the 
Patriarch of Chaozhou”, an important clan of businessmen from the town of 
Chaozhou, Guangdong Province. He also received recognition from the British 
government with the granting of two Most Excellent Orders of the British Empire, 
Officer (OBE) and Commander (CBE), in 1955 and 1961, respectively. In addition, 
the father maintained a very good relationship with the firm’s employees, providing 
his employees the best benefits among all bus companies in Hong Kong.  
 
Ngan Kit-ling, the daughter, took over the daily operations of CMB in the mid-
1990s. Both her career as practicing lawyer and notary public and her professional 
management style damaged rather than strengthened the company’s relationships with 
employees and government officials. Her tough style in handling the political network 
is one of the direct factors leading to the loss of all remaining franchised bus lines in 
Hong Kong Island in 1998. Subsequently, Ngan King-kwan stayed in the hospital 
until he died in 2001.  
 
This comparison shows that there was a significant change in the firm’s specific 
assets, such as social prestige, political network, employee loyalty, and government 
franchise, around the family succession. After the succession, the company began to 
rely less on government franchise by switching more to real estate development as the 
company’s core business. In addition, market mechanisms such as the hostile takeover 
threat by Yu Ming Investment Ltd. in mid-2002 induced the company to adopt more 
stringent governance standards such as issuing special dividends to its shareholders. 
 
Sources:   
China Motor Bus Memorial Page (in Chinese): http://www.chinamotorbus.com/   27 
Annual Report of China Motor Bus Ltd. in corresponding years.  28 
Case 2: Non-founder succession 
Hysan Development Company Ltd., one of the top ten property companies in 
Southeast Asia, was incorporated in 1970; its parent company, Lee Hysan Estate Company, 
the oldest property company in Hong Kong, was founded by Lee Hysan in 1923. Lee’s 
family was one of the top four families in Hong Kong in the 1920s. Hysan’s wealth was 
mainly generated from the opium business in Hong Kong, Macao, and Canton. With such 
wealth, Hysan made his most high-profile transaction by purchasing from William Buchanan 
Jardine the East Point Hill. Lee’s family converted this area, now known as Causeway Bay, 
to become the most expensive shopping district, as measured by retail rental cost, in the 
world and the family is regarded as “the Landlord of Causeway Bay”.  
Lee Hysan’s oldest son, Lee Ming Chak, took charge of the family business after Lee 
Hysan was murdered in 1928. He led the family business successfully over the next 55 years, 
culminating in a listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1981. In addition to 
accumulating financial wealth, Lee Ming Chak also amassed rich political capital over this 
period. He served in twelve different prestigious positions in the Hong Kong government 
including the Legislative Council, the Executive Council, the Advisory Commission on 
Corruption, the Panel of Inland Revenue Board of Review, and the Board of Education. He 
maintained close ties with political leaders in the mainland, as evidenced by his close 
personal relationship with Zhou Enlai and the bailout of his family-owned company in the 
mainland by Hu Yaobang. Lee Ming Chak was also awarded two of the Most Excellent 
Orders of the British Empire, Officer (OBE) and Commander (CBE), and was designated[?] 
Justice of the Peace in recognition of his contribution in business and politics in Hong Kong. 
   Upon the death of Lee Ming Chak in 1983, management of the company was 
transferred to a Lee family team consisting of Jung Sen, Wing Tat, and Hon Chiu, with Jung 
Sen serving as chairman. While Ming Chak was still in power, his plan was to eventually 
pass the chairmanship to Hon Chiu. As training for taking the helm of the company, Hon 
Chou was appointed to a senior management position of the company when Ming Chak was 
still the chairman. Hon Chiu formally took up the chairmanship in 1988.  Hon Chiu continued 
the family’s success, ranking No. 490 in Forbes’ Rich List in 2001 when he retired from the 
chairmanship of the company. He was also rich with political capital, as evidenced by serving 
in the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong government, the nominating committee for the 
first Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultation Conference.  
In 2001, Hon Chiu decided to pass on the chairmanship to his cousin, Lee Ting Chang. 
A difference between Ting Chang and his predecessors is that he has not taken up any 
government position or political appointment.  His only public recognition to date is Justice 
of the Peace. However, Ting Chang is qualified as a Solicitor on the Supreme Court of 
England and Wales. Under the leadership of Ting Chang, Hysan Development Company was 
ranked among the companies with the best corporate governance practices by the 2006 
research report of the Hong Kong Institute of Directors and the City University of Hong 
Kong.  
One salient observation in the analysis of the chairman succession is that the family’s 
political capital has declined, while the firm’s emphasis on professionalism and corporate 
governance has increased over the three generations. It also appears that the chairman   29 
succession became better organized. The succession in the earlier stage of the company 
occurred only when the predecessor died while still in a position of control. However, the 
succession in the later stage of the company involved a smoother transition with more careful 
planning by Hong Chiu.  
Sources: 
Poy, V., 1995. A River Named Lee. Scarborough, Ont.: Calyan Publishing Ltd. 
Poy, V., 1998, Building bridges : the life & times of Richard Charles Lee, Hong Kong, 1905-
1983. Scarborough, Ont.: Calyan Publishing Ltd. 
Prospectus and Annual Report of Hysan Development Company in corresponding years. 
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Table 1 Sample Summary Statistics 
Panel A:  Distribution by year of succession 
This table presents the sample distribution by succession year, economy, and succession type (founder vs. non-founder). A succession event is defined as an 
entrepreneur (founder or non-founder) stepping down from the chairman position.  Total indicates the total number of succession events in the year. Founder 
indicates the total number of founder successions in the year. % indicates the founder succession as a percentage of the total number of successions in the year.  
   Hong Kong     Singapore     Taiwan     Pooled 
   Total   Founder  %    Total   Founder  %     Total  Founder  %     Total   Founder  % 
1987  0  -  -     0  -  -    2  1  50%    2  1  50% 
1988  0  -  -    0  -  -    3  3  100%    3  3  100% 
1989  0  -  -    0  -  -    6  6  100%    6  6  100% 
1990  0  -  -    0  -  -    6  6  100%    6  6  100% 
1991  0  -  -    1  0  0%    5  4  80%    6  4  67% 
1992  0  -  -    6  0  0%    6  6  100%    12  6  50% 
1993  0  -  -    5  0  0%    4  2  50%    9  2  22% 
1994  0  -  -    6  1  17%    7  6  86%    13  7  54% 
1995  0  -  -    4  0  0%    6  3  50%    10  3  30% 
1996  4  2  50%    5  0  0%    11  8  73%    20  10  50% 
1997  7  3  43%    2  0  0%    5  5  100%    14  8  57% 
1998  4  1  25%    3  1  33%    7  5  71%    14  7  50% 
1999  12  10  83%    6  1  17%    12  8  67%    30  19  63% 
2000  14  7  50%    5  0  0%    13  8  62%    32  15  47% 
2001  11  6  55%    1  0  0%    12  9  75%    24  15  63% 
2002  9  2  22%    3  0  0%    0  -  -    12  2  17% 
2003  7  4  57%    4  1  25%    0  -  -    11  5  45% 
2004  3  2  67%    1  0  0%    0  -  -    4  2  50% 
2005  2  1  50%    1  1  100%    0  -  -    3  2  67% 
Total  73  38  52%     53  5  9%     105  80  76%     231  123  53%   33 
 
Table 1 Sample Summary Statistics (continued) 
Panel B: Distribution by industry 
This panel presents the sample distribution by one-digit SIC code, economy, and succession type (founder vs. non-founder). Total indicates the 
total number of succession events in the industry. Founder indicates the total number of founder successions in the industry. % indicates the 
founder succession as a percentage of the total number of successions in the industry. 
   Hong Kong    Singapore    Taiwan     Pooled 
   Total   Founder  %    Total  Founder  %     Total  Founder  %     Total   Founder  % 
                                            
Agriculture and 
Mining  
4  1  25%    3  0  0%    5  4  80%    12  5  42% 
Manufacturing and 
Construction 
28  17  61%    15  3  20%    76  56  74%    119  76  64% 
Transportation  6  3  50%    5  2  40%    11  9  82%    22  14  64% 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade 
9  6  67%    5  0  0%    6  5  83%    20  11  55% 
Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 
21  10  48%    13  0  0%    3  2  67%    37  12  32% 
Services  5  1  20%    12  0  0%    4  4  100%    21  5  24% 
Total  73  38  52%    53  5  9%    105  80  76%    231  123  53% 
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Table 2 Level of Discretionary Accruals in the Pre-succession and Post-succession Periods 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics of unsigned discretionary accruals and control variables used in the multivariate regression in Panel B. Discretionary 
accruals are estimated as follows:  
  1) total accruals of firm i in year t are measured as: TAit=(∆CAit-∆CASHit)-(∆CLit-∆STDit-∆TPit)-DEPit, where ∆CAit  is change in current assets, 
  ∆CASHit  is change in cash, ∆CLit is change in current liabilities, ∆STDit is change in short-term debt, ∆TPit is change in taxes payable, and DEPit is 
  depreciation expenses.  
  2) normal accruals are predicted by the following model, estimated using all firms without a succession event in each one-digit SIC industry for each 
fiscal year:  
  TAit/ASSETit-1= β1×1/ ASSETit-1 +β2× (∆SALESit-∆ARit)/ ASSETit-1 +β3×PPEit/ ASSETit-1 +β4×ROAit+εit, where ASSETSit-1 is total assets of firm i in 
year t-1, ∆SALESit  is change in sales of firm i in year t, ∆ARit is change in accounts receivable of firm i in year t, PPEit is net property, plant, and 
equipment of firm i in year t, ROAit is return on assets of firm i in year t.  
  3) discretionary accruals are calculated using the normal accruals prediction model above.  
For the control variables, SIZE is the logarithm of sales, LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, MB is the market-to-book equity ratio, 
PRE-ROA is the average return on assets in the five years preceding the succession year, and OWNERSHIP is the percentage of shares owned by the family. 
The pre-succession period is the five years preceding the succession year. The post-succession period is the succession year or the five years after the 
succession year. *** and * denote significance at the 1% and 10% level in the mean or median difference of pre- and post-succession periods.  
   Pre-Succession Period  Post-Succession Period 
   N  Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median 
           
Primary Variables             
DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS  1,041  0.12  0.085  1,228  0.098***  0.068*** 
             
Control variables             
SIZE  1,041  11.253  11.382  1,228  11.349*  11.430* 
LEVERAGE  1,041  0.437  0.433  1,228  0.407***  0.389*** 
MB  1,041  1.944  1.575  1,228  1.606***  1.132*** 
PRE-ROA  999  0.023  0.032  1,178  0.03  0.033 
OWNERSHIP  999  37.6  39.76  1,178  36.82  35.43 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
The spearman pairwise correlation coefficient is reported in this panel. ACCRUAL is the unsigned discretionary accruals; FOUNDER is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the predecessor is the founder of the firm and zero otherwise; SUCCESSION equals one for post-succession 
firms and zero for pre-succession firms; SIZE is the logarithm of sales in the fiscal year; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
at fiscal year-end; MTB is the market-to-book equity ratio at the fiscal year-end; PRE-ROA is the average return on assets in the five years 
preceding succession year; and OWNERSHIP is the percentage of shares owned by the family at the end of the fiscal year.   
   ACCRUALS  FOUNDER  SUCCESSION  SIZE  LEVERAGE  MTB  PRE-ROA  OWNERSHIP  
                 
ACCRUALS  1               
FOUNDER  0.00  1             
SUCCESSION  -0.10  0.02  1           
SIZE  -0.09  0.00  0.04  1         
LEVERAGE  0.07  -0.03  -0.08  0.22  1       
MTB  0.19  0.15  -0.15  0.07  0.05  1     
PRE-ROA  0.01  0.27  0.04  0.10  -0.34  0.23  1   
OWNERSHIP   0.05  0.07  -0.03  -0.17  0.01  -0.13  -0.02  1 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel C: Multivariate analysis 
This table provides the results of the comparison in unsigned discretionary accruals 
between the pre-succession (five years before succession) and post-succession (the 
year of succession or five years after succession) periods. The dependent variable is 
the unsigned discretionary accruals as defined in Panel A of this table. Independent 
variables include SUCCESSION, an indicator variable that equals one for firms in the 
post-succession period and  zero for firms in the pre-succession period; SIZE, the 
logarithm of sales; LEVERAGE, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; MB, the 
market-to-book equity ratio; PRE-ROA, the average return on assets in the pre-
succession period; and OWNERSHIP, the percentage of shares owned by the family. 
Year, industry and country fixed effects are controlled for but not reported. OLS with 
errors clustered by country and firm is applied. Absolute t-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
SUCCESSION  -0.022  -0.016  -0.016 
  (1.88)*  (2.38)**  (2.79)*** 
SIZE    -0.012  -0.012 
    (9.18)***  (7.05)*** 
LEVERAGE    0.031  0.043 
    (1.65)  (2.16)** 
MTB    0.013  0.013 
    (13.90)***  (11.45)*** 
PRE-ROA      0.042 
      (1.68)* 
OWNERSHIP      0.000 
      (3.57)*** 
Constant  0.247  0.367  0.346 
  (4.62)***  (6.72)***  (5.57)*** 
Observations  2269  2269  2177 
Adjusted R-squared  0.08  0.13  0.14 
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Table 3 Timely Loss Recognition in Pre-succession and Post-succession Periods 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
This table presents descriptive statistics of variables used in testing timely loss recognition in earnings-returns and income persistence analyses. 
RETURN is the annual net-of-market return over a fiscal year. EARNINGS is net income scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning 
of the fiscal year. ΔINCt (ΔINCt-1) is the change in net income scaled by total assets at the end of year t (t-1). The pre-succession period is the 
five years preceding the succession year. The post-succession period is the succession year or the five years after the succession year. ***, **, 
and *  denote significance at the 1% level in the mean and median difference between the pre- and post-succession periods. 
   Pre-Succession Period  
Post-Succession 
 Period 
   Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
         
Variables for earnings-return association 
analysis         
RETURN  -0.054  -0.094  0.013***  -0.055*** 
EARNINGS  0.019  0.042  -0.017***  0.033*** 
Observations  834  1,178 
         
Variables for income persistence 
analysis         
ΔINCt  0.001  0.003  0.007  0.002 
ΔINCt-1  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.002 
Observations  1,018  1,296 
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Table 3 Timely Loss Recognition  
Panel B: Regression results 
This table presents results of tests on the effect of succession on timely loss recognition based on earnings-returns analysis in model (1) and 
income persistence analysis in model (2). In the earnings-returns analysis, the dependent variable is EARNINGS, which is net income scaled 
by market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year.  Independent variables include RETURN, which is the annual net-of-market 
return within the fiscal year; RD, an indicator for bad news that takes the value of one when RETURN is negative and zero otherwise; 
SUCCESSION, an indicator variable that equals one for firms in the post-succession period and zero for firms in the pre-succession period; 
and all the interaction terms among RETURN, RD, and SUCCESSION. In the income persistence analysis, the dependent variable is ΔINCt, 
the change in net income scaled by total assets at the end of year t. Independent variables include ΔINCt-1, which is the change in net income 
scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1; DΔINCt-1, which equals one if ΔINCt-1 is negative and zero otherwise; SUCCESSION; and all 
the  interaction  terms  among  ΔINCt-1,  DΔINCt-1,  and SUCCESSION.  OLS regression is applied. Absolute t-values  are  reported in 
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Earnings-Returns Association  Income Persistence 
  Model (1)    Model (2) 
 Independent variable 
Post-Succession vs. 
Pre-Succession 




RETURN  0.003  ΔINCt-1  -0.125 
  (0.18)    (2.08)** 
RD  -0.013  DΔINC t-1  -0.009 
  (0.87)    (1.47) 
RETURN×RD  0.109  ΔINC t-1×DΔINC t-1  -0.382 
  (3.68)***    (4.32)*** 
RD×SUCCESSION  0.020  DΔINC t-1×SUCCESSION  -0.009 
  (1.01)    (1.06) 
RETURN×SUCCESSION  0.011  ΔINC t-1×SUCCESSION  0.025 
  (0.54)    (0.34) 
SUCCESSION  -0.030  SUCCESSION  0.004 
  (2.30)**    (0.69) 
RETURN×RD×SUCESSION  0.070  ΔINC t-1×DΔINC t-1×SUCCESSION 
 
-0.153 
  (1.73)*  (1.40) 
Constant  0.061  Constant  -0.002 
  (5.93)***    (0.46) 
Observations  2,012  Observations  2,314 
Adjusted R-squared  0.08  Adjusted R-squared  0.11   40 
Table 4 Effect of Founder on Discretionary Accruals 
This table provides results on tests of the effect of a founder predecessor on the difference in unsigned discretionary accruals between pre-succession (five 
years prior to succession) and post-succession (the year of succession or five years after succession) periods and on the level of unsigned discretionary 
accruals in the pre-succession period. The dependent variable is unsigned discretionary accruals. The independent variables include SUCCESSION, which 
equals one for firms in the post-succession period and zero for firms in the pre-succession period; FOUNDER, which equals one if the predecessor is a 
founder and zero otherwise; the interaction between FOUNDER and SUCCESSION; SIZE, the logarithm of sales in the fiscal year; LEVERAGE, the ratio 
of total liabilities to total assets at fiscal year-end; MB, the market-to-book equity ratio at fiscal year-end; PRE-ROA, the average return on assets in the 
pre-succession period; and OWNERSHIP, the percentage of shares owned by the family.  Year, industry, and country fixed effects are controlled for but 
not reported. OLS with errors clustered by country and firm is applied. ***, **, and *  denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
   Post-Succession vs. Pre-Succession Periods  Pre-Succession Period 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)     Model (4)  Model (5) 
FOUNDER  0.014  0.012  0.009    0.017  0.014 
  (1.52)  (1.62)  (1.18)    (1.33)  (1.27) 
SUCCESSION*FOUNDER  -0.021  -0.016  -0.014       
  (2.18)**  (2.75)***  (4.28)***       
SUCCESSION  -0.011  -0.007  -0.008       
  (0.81)  (0.93)  (1.83)*       
SIZE    -0.012  -0.012      -0.014 
    (8.33)***  (6.52)***      (3.09)*** 
LEVERAGE    0.030  0.041      0.042 
    (1.63)  (2.15)**      (1.21) 
MTB    0.013  0.013      0.011 
    (13.57)***  (11.34)***      (4.59)*** 
PRE-ROA      0.040       
      (1.43)       
OWNERSHIP      0.000       
      (4.46)***       
Constant  0.239  0.361  0.341    0.277  0.416 
  (4.50)***  (6.53)***  (5.60)***    (5.30)***  (4.09)*** 
Observations  2269  2269  2177    1041  1041 
Adjusted R-squared  0.08  0.13  0.14     0.11  0.16   41 
 
Table 5 Effect of Founder on Timely Loss Recognition 
Panel A: Change in timely loss recognition 
This table provides results on tests of the effect of a founder predecessor on the difference in timely loss recognition between pre-succession (five years prior to 
succession) and post-succession (the year of succession or five years after succession) periods. In the earnings-returns association analysis, the dependent 
variable is EARNINGS, which is net income scaled by market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year.  Independent variables include RETURN, 
which is the annual net-of-market returns of the fiscal year; RD, which is an indicator for bad news that takes the value of one when RETURN is negative and 
zero otherwise; SUCCESSION, which equals one for firms in the post-succession period and zero for firms in the pre-succession period, and all the interaction 
terms among RETURN, RD, and SUCCESSION. In the income persistence analysis, the dependent variable is ΔINCt, the change in net income scaled by total 
assets at the end of year t. Independent variables include ΔINCt-1, which is the change in net income scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1; DΔINCt-1, which 
equals one if ΔINCt-1 is negative and zero otherwise; SUCCESSION, which is defined above; and all the interaction terms among ΔINCt-1, DΔINCt-1, and 
SUCCESSION. OLS regression is applied. Absolute t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,  
respectivel










RETURN  0.011  -0.002    ΔINC t-1  -0.130  -0.119 
  (0.47)  (0.09)      (1.62)  (1.32) 
RD  -0.028  0.007    DΔINC t-1  -0.001  -0.018 
  (1.44)  (0.30)      (0.11)  (1.94)* 
RETURN×RD  0.055  0.174    ΔINC t-1×DΔINC t-1  -0.322  -0.440 
  (1.40)  (3.82)***      (2.65)***  (3.39)*** 
RD×SUCCESSION  0.046  -0.012    DΔINC t-1×SUCCESSION  -0.015  -0.003 
  (1.83)*  (0.40)      (1.30)  (0.21) 
RETURN×SUCCESSION  0.016  0.004    ΔINC t-1×SUCCESSION  0.094  -0.036 
  (0.55)  (0.12)      (0.95)  (0.34) 
SUCCESSION  -0.037  -0.024    SUCCESSION  0.001  0.006 
  (2.13)**  (1.19)      (0.18)  (0.69) 
RETURN×RD×SUCCESSION  0.095  0.039    ΔINC t-1×DΔINC t-1×SUCCESSION  -0.305  -0.016 
  (1.80)*  (0.63)      (2.03)**  (0.10) 
Constant  0.068  0.054    Constant  -0.001  -0.002 
  (4.85)***  (3.57)***      (0.27)  (0.38) 
Observations  1,055  957    Observations  1,242  1,072 
Adjusted R-squared  0.07  0.09     Adjusted R-squared  0.11  0.11   42 
Table 5 Effect of Founder on Timely Loss Recognition 
Panel B: Level in Timely Loss Recognition 
This table provides results on tests for the effect of a founder predecessor on timely loss 
recognition in the pre-succession period (five years before the succession). In earnings-returns 
association analysis, the dependent variable is EARNINGS, which is net income scaled by 
market value at beginning of the fiscal year. Independent variables include RETURN, the annual 
net-of-market stock return over the fiscal year; RD, an indicator for bad news that takes the value 
of one when RETURN is negative and zero otherwise; FOUNDER, which equals one if the 
predecessor is a founder and zero otherwise; and all the interaction terms among RETURN, RD, 
and FOUNDER. In the income persistence analysis, the dependent variable is ΔINCt, the change 
in net income scaled by total assets at the end of year t. Independent variables include ΔINCt-1, 
which is the change in net income scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1; DΔINCt-1,which 
equals one if ΔINCt-1 is negative and zero otherwise; FOUNDER, which equals one if the 
predecessor is a founder and zero otherwise; and all the interaction terms among ΔINCt-1, 
DΔINCt-1, and FOUNDER.  OLS regression is applied. Absolute t-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Earnings-Return Association    Income Persistence 
RETURN  -0.027    ΔINC t-1  -0.100 
  (0.91)      (1.34) 
RD  0.019    DΔINC t-1  -0.027 
  (0.67)      (2.13)** 
RETURN×RD  0.299    ΔINC t-1×DΔINC t-1  -0.582 
  (5.22)***      (5.51)*** 
RD×FOUNDER  -0.034    DΔINC t-1×FOUNDER  0.022 
  (0.86)      (1.22) 
RETURN×FOUNDER  0.033    ΔINC t-1×FOUNDER  -0.139 
  (0.73)      (1.13) 
FOUNDER  0.012    FOUNDER  0.002 
  (0.43)      (0.20) 
RETURN×RD×FOUNDER  -0.158    ΔINC t-1×DΔINC t-1×FOUNDER  0.275 
  (1.99)**      (1.72)* 
Constant  0.057    Constant  -0.007 
  (3.03)***      (0.90) 
Observations  834    Observations  1,018 
Adjusted R-squared  0.07     Adjusted R-squared  0.14   43 
Table 6 Effect of Founder’s Age and Education on Earnings Properties 
Panel A: Age and education level between founder and non-founder predecessors 
This panel presents the descriptive statistics of a predecessor’s age and education 
level.  Founder indicates that the predecessor is a founder. Non-founder indicates 
that the predecessor is not the founder of the firm. Age of the predecessor is 
measured in the succession year. Education level is the predecessor’s final degree 
in the succession year, which is coded as: 1-below bachelor, 2-bachelor, 3-master, 
and 4-doctor. *** denotes significance at the 1% level in the founder’s mean or 
median difference from that of the non-founder.  
 
   Founder  Non-Founder  Pooled 
       
Age       
Observations  110  58  168 
Mean  70.57***  61.5  67.44 
Median  72***  60  70 
       
Education Level     
Observations  84  43  127 
Mean  1.53***  1.98  1.72 
Median  1***  2  2 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel B: Effect of founder’s age and education on discretionary accruals 
This panel presents results of tests on the effect of a founder’s age and education on the unsigned 
discretionary accruals in the pre-succession period (five years before the succession). The 
dependent variable is unsigned discretionary accruals. Independent variables include 
FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND, which is the founder’s age in model (1) and an indicator 
variable that equals one if the founder’s age is at or above 80 in the succession year and zero 
otherwise in model (2), and the founder’s education level in model (3) and an indicator variable 
that equals one if the founder received an education level at or above a bachelor degree in the 
succession year and zero otherwise in model (4); SIZE, the logarithm of sales in the fiscal year; 
LEVERAGE, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at fiscal year-end; and MB, market-to-
book equity ratio at fiscal year-end.  Year, industry, and country fixed effects are controlled for 
but not reported.  OLS with errors clustered by country and firm is applied. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
  Founder Age  Founder’s Education 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND  0.000  0.003  -0.022  -0.039 
  (0.78)  (1.02)  (6.14)***  (4.43)*** 
SIZE  -0.012  -0.012  -0.011  -0.011 
  (6.50)***  (7.04)***  (7.63)***  (9.35)*** 
LEVERAGE  0.042  0.043  0.078  0.067 
  (2.49)**  (2.72)***  (2.29)**  (2.07)** 
MB  0.012  0.012  0.014  0.013 
  (3.07)***  (3.07)***  (2.75)***  (2.63)** 
Constant  0.374  0.122  0.298  0.103 
  (14.74)***  (6.74)***  (5.26)***  (2.35)** 
Observations  539  539  386  386 
Adjusted R-squared  0.17  0.17  0.28  0.28 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel C. Effect of founder’s age and education on timely loss recognition 
This panel presents results of tests on the effect of a founder’s age and education on 
timely recognition in the pre-succession period (five years after the succession). In the 
earnings-returns association analysis, the dependent variable is EARNINGS, which is 
net income scaled by market value at the beginning of the fiscal year. Independent 
variables include RETURN, the annual net-of-market stock return within the fiscal 
year; RD, an indicator for bad news that takes the value of one when RETURN is 
negative and zero otherwise; FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND, which is the founder’s 
age in model (1) and an indicator variable that equals one if the founder’s age is at or 
above 80 in the succession year and zero otherwise in model (2), and the founder’s 
education level in model (3) and an indicator variable that equals one if the founder 
received an education level at or above bachelor degree in the succession year and 
zero otherwise in model (4); and all the interaction terms among RETURN, RD, and 
FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND. In the income persistence analysis, the dependent 
variable is ΔINCt, the change in net income scaled by total assets at the end of year t. 
Independent variables include ΔINCt-1, which is the change in net income scaled by 
total asset at the end of year t-1; DΔINCt-1,which equals one if ΔINCt-1 is negative and 
zero otherwise; FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND, which in models (5), (6) , (7), and (8) 
have the same definitions as those in models (1), (2), (3), and (4), respectively; and all 
the interaction terms among ΔINCt-1, DΔINCt-1, and FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND. 
OLS regression is applied. Absolute t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **,  and 
* denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  46 
 
Earnings-Return Association     Income Persistence 
  Founder's Age  Founder's Education      Founder's Age  Founder's Education 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)       Model (5)  Model (6)  Model (7)  Model (8) 
RETURN  0.070  0.007  0.022  0.040    ΔINC  0.547  -0.033  -0.074  -0.091 
  (0.40)  (0.18)  (0.54)  (1.60)      (1.28)  (0.35)  (0.42)  (0.88) 
RD  0.252  -0.005  -0.099  -0.050    DΔINC  0.041  0.003  -0.010  -0.001 
  (1.46)  (0.16)  (2.68)***  (2.27)**      (0.87)  (0.29)  (0.58)  (0.05) 
RETURN*RD  0.882  0.205  -0.219  -0.102    ΔINC*DΔINC  -1.344  -0.465  -0.463  -0.243 
  (3.02)***  (3.30)***  (2.83)***  (2.19)**      (2.06)**  (3.29)***  (1.57)  (1.36) 
RD*FOUNDER’S 
BACKGROUND  -0.004  -0.042  0.048  0.069   
DΔINC*FOUNDER’S 
BACKGROUND  -0.001  -0.017  0.006  0.002 
  (1.62)  (0.73)  (2.22)**  (1.88)*      (0.95)  (1.01)  (0.68)  (0.13) 
RETURN*FOUNDER’S 
BACKGROUND  -0.001  0.005  0.016  0.018    ΔIND*FOUNDER’S BACKGROUND  -0.010  -0.411  -0.023  -0.067 
  (0.34)  (0.07)  (0.61)  (0.39)      (1.61)  (2.22)**  (0.23)  (0.35) 
FOUNDER’S 
BACKGROUND  0.002  0.015  -0.011  -0.030    FOUNDER’S ATTRIBTUES  0.001  0.019  0.000  -0.000 
  (1.16)  (0.38)  (0.67)  (1.16)      (1.75)*  (1.77)*  (0.08)  (0.01) 
RETURN*RD*FOUNDER’S 
BACKGROUND  -0.011  -0.232  0.104  0.123   
ΔINC*DΔINC*FOUNDER’S 
BACKGROUND  0.015  0.624  0.220  0.382 
  (2.65)***  (1.91)*  (2.30)**  (1.51)      (1.59)  (2.12)**  (1.38)  (1.27) 
Constant  -0.080  0.064  0.068  0.062    Constant  -0.052  -0.007  0.002  0.003 
  (0.61)  (2.56)**  (2.48)**  (4.15)***      (1.74)*  (1.08)  (0.22)  (0.49) 
Observations  390  390  274  274    Observations  486  486  367  367 
Adjusted R-squared  0.11  0.08  0.06  0.05     Adjusted R-squared  0.07  0.08  0.01  0.01   45 
 
                                                 
1 We define our sample firms as entrepreneurial firms because the majority of our 
sample firms are founder-managed before succession. Following Burkart, Panunzi, 
and Shleifer (2003), the family firms should be those firms that have been managed 
by the family for more than one generation. Otherwise, the firm should be regarded as 
an entrepreneurial firm.  
2 This paper focuses on the comparison between founder and non-founder successions. 
We do not further divide the 231 firms in our sample based on succession by heirs 
versus professional managers. The choice of successors is likely to be endogenously 
related to whether the predecessor is a founder or not and his level of specific assets.   
3 There is little difference between the chief executive function and the chairman 
function in an Asian firm. 
4 We find similar results in the paper using the following three alternatives of the 
Jones (1993) model:  
  1) TAit/ASSETit-1    = β1*1/ ASSETit-1 +β2*∆SALESit/ ASSETit-1 +β3*PPEit/ 
  ASSETit-1 +εit ,  
  2) TAit/ASSETit-1    = β1*1/ ASSETit-1 +β2*(∆SALESit-∆ARit)/ ASSETit-1 
  +β3*PPEit/ ASSETit-1 +εit ,  and  
  3) TAit/ASSETit-1    = β1*1/ ASSETit-1 +β2*∆SALESit/ ASSETit-1 +β3*PPEit/ 
  ASSETit-1 +β4*ROAit+εit . 
 
5 We remove the years 1997 and 1998 to avoid the confounding effects of the Asian 
financial crisis in the accruals regressions and the timely loss recognition regressions. 
Our results remain qualitatively the same.   
6 Note that succession is unlikely to be completely exogenous. However, the median 
age of the founder-predecessors (see Table 6 Panel A) is 72, which suggests that these 
founders are likely to be forced to step down due to advancement in age.  
7 Due to data limitations for the 1980s in the Worldscope database, we use net income 
instead of net income before extraordinary items for E. As a robustness check, we 
also use net income from operations over sales to proxy for E and the main results in 
all the earnings-returns and income persistence analyses are qualitatively unchanged.   
8 The earnings-returns regression results in Table 3 are consistent with this alternative 
explanation. The income persistence analysis, however, is not confounded by this 
explanation, providing a stronger test of our specialized assets hypothesis.    
9 We repeat this earnings-returns regression economy-by-economy and find that the 
coefficient on RETURN × RD × SUCCESSION remains significantly positive for 
Singapore (t-stats = 2.42) and Taiwan (t-stats = 4.05), but it is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero for Hong Kong. Similarly, when we rerun the unsigned 
discretionary accruals regression model (2) of Table 2 Panel C, the coefficient on 
SUCCESSION is consistently negative but it is statistically significant (t-stats = 3.96) 
only in Taiwan, probably due to lack of power.    46 
                                                                                                                                            
10 Finally, we also control for the variable FIRM AGE, the number of years since the 
firm was founded, in Table 4 model (3) as well as in Table 2 Panel B model (3), due 
to the concern that the operations of older firms are presumably more standardized 
and thus their accounting information is more transparent. The coefficient on 
SUCCESSION remains negative and significant in both regressions. 
 
11 Note that in addition to our contracting argument, the earnings-returns results in 
Table 3 model (1) are consistent with an alternative explanation. Specifically, the 
impairment of specialized assets causes a decline in stock returns but not a 
corresponding write-off charge against earnings because these intangible assets have 
never been recognized in the books. However, our income persistence analysis among 
the founder-succession subgroup supports our contracting hypothesis because it does 
not use stock returns in the regressions and thus is unlikely to be confounded by this 
alternative explanation. 
12 The percentage of founder-succession firms in Singapore is significantly smaller 
than that of the other two economies. As a robustness check, we repeat our analyses in 
Tables 3 and 4 without the Singaporean firms and the main results for unsigned 
discretionary accruals and timely loss recognition continue to hold.  